• 中国计算机学会会刊
  • 中国科技核心期刊
  • 中文核心期刊

Computer Engineering & Science ›› 2021, Vol. 43 ›› Issue (10): 1720-1729.

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A strategy-proof auction mechanism for resource allocation in edge computing systems

CHI Lai-xin,YANG Xu-tao,XIE Ning,ZHANG Xue-jie   

  1. (School of Information Science and Engineering,Yunnan University,Kunming 650000,China)
  • Received:2020-07-28 Revised:2020-11-20 Accepted:2021-10-25 Online:2021-10-25 Published:2021-10-21

Abstract: The use of auction mechanisms to allocate computing resources is a major challenging problem in the current field of edge computing. However, most of the current researches are based on a single type of resources and unable to meet the strategy-proof requirement. Aiming at this issue, this paper designs a strategy-proof auction mechanism for resource allocation in edge computing systems. The auction mechanism can allocate multiple resources in the form of virtual machines. It can improve the resource utilization and the social welfare effectively by taking into account the density of resource requirements, deployment constraints, and resource capacity simultaneously. It calculates the critical price as the payment price by dichotomy so that it can increase the calculation speed and meets the strategy-  proof requirement. Experimental results show that the mechanism can improve the resource utilization and the social welfare significantly and calculate the result in a short time. 

Key words: edge computing, resource allocation, strategy-proof, auction